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TORTS-GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY -POLICE OFFICER 
PURSUING SUSPECT OWES DUTY OF CARE TO THIRD 
PARTIES INJURED BY THE FLEEING SUSPECT; 
INJURED PLAINTIFF CAN RECOVER FROM STATE AND 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS IF OFFICER WAS 
NEGLIGENT IN COMMENCING AND MAINTAINING 
PURSUIT. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With screaming sirens and flashing lights, the police chase the 
suspect's automobile through crowded city streets. The suspect panics 
and miscalculates a turn, ending the chase in a bloody crash in which 
an innocent third person is killed. This devastating scene no longer 
appears only on television and in the movies; it is occurring frequently 
on the nation's streets and hundreds of people are dying as a result.· 
These accidents have led to an increase in lawsuits against police 
officers, municipalities, and state governments.2 Traditionally, many 
of these plaintiffs were left uncompensated because of various forms 
of governmental immunity and the refusal of many courts to place 
legal restraints on police officers during the pursuit of suspects. As 
more legislatures waive governmental immunity, however, courts have 
been increasingly willing to allow injured plaintiffs to recover for 
police negligence during high speed pursuits. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland recently addressed this growing problem in Boyer v. 
State. 3 
The Boyer court interpreted several statutory waiver provisions 
as waiving governmental immunity for actions based on the negligent 
commencement and continuation of a high speed pursuit.4 The court 
also held that a police officer owes a duty of due care to innocent 
third persons injured by the suspect who is fleeing the officer. S The 
Boyer decision is significant because it provides a remedy for innocent 
1. According to one recent study, 45010 of high speed pursuits result in property 
damage, 34010 result in an accident and 23% involve personal injury. Geoffrey 
P. Alpert & Roger G. Dunham, Policing Hot Pursuits: The Discovery of 
Aleatory Elements, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 528 (1989). 
2. See Sean M. Carlin, Comment, High-Speed Pursuits: Police Officer and 
Municipal Liability for Accidents Involving the Pursued and an Innocent Third 
Party, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 101, 111-12 (1986). 
3. 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991). 
4. Id. at 574-75, 594 A.2d at 129. 
5. Id. at 585-88, 594 A.2d at 134-36. 
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tort victims, along with a reasonable means of reducing the growing 
number of injuries resulting from high speed pursuits. 
II. THE PURSUIT 
In Boyer v. State,6 Maryland State Trooper Robert C. Titus 
observed another vehicle being driven in an unsafe manner and 
Trooper Titus suspected the driver, Richard Farrar, was intoxicated.7 
When Farrar's vehicle stopped at a red light, Trooper Titus ap-
proached the vehicle and told Farrar to pull over as soon as the light 
turned green.8 When the light turned green, Farrar, instead of pulling 
over, pulled away at a high rate of speed. 9 Trooper Titus began 
pursuing the vehicle and was joined by Charles County Deputy 
Sheriffs and other Maryland State Troopers.lO The chase continued 
at high rates of speed for approximately seven miles}1 
The chase ended when Farrar's vehicle hit the rear of a vehicle 
occupied by Mary and Joseph BoyerY Both Mr. and Mrs. Boyer 
died as a result of the accident. 13 The surviving sons of the couple 
filed suit against the State of Maryland, the County Commissioners 
of Charles County, Trooper Titus, and Richard Farrar. 14 The State, 
Trooper Titus, and the County Commissioners of Charles County 
all filed motions for summary judgement on the grounds that they 
were entitled to governmental immunity and that Trooper Titus owed 
no duty to the Boyers in regard to the injuries caused by Farrar .IS 
The circuit court granted all three motions for summary judgement 
and the court of special appeals affirmed. 16 The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland then granted the plaintiff's petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
6. 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991). 
7. [d. at 562, 594 A.2d at 123. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. at 563, 594 A.2d at 123. 
10. [d. 
11. [d. The plaintiffs alleged that the police reached speeds in excess of 100 miles 
per hour during the course of the chase. The plaintiffs also alleged that Trooper 
Titus failed to immediately activate all of his emergency equipment. [d. at 
563, 594 A.2d at 124. 
12. !d. at 563, 594 A.2d at 124. 
13. [d. 
14. [d. at 563-64, 594 A.2d at 124. The plaintiffs also named the Charles County 
"Sheriff's Department" as a defendant but the court of appeals concluded 
that the Charles County "Sheriff's Department" is not an entity capable of 
being sued. [d. at 572 n.9, 594 A.2d at 128 n.9. 
15. [d. at 568-70, 594 A.2d at 126-27. 
16. Boyer v. State, 80 Md. App. 101, 560 A.2d 48 (1989). 
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III. LEGAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
In any suit brought against the government and its employees 
based on the alleged negligence of a governmental employee, the first 
step is to determine whether the government and the governmental 
employee are immune from suit. The state will likely argue that it is 
protected under the principle of sovereign immunity - a doctrine 
which bars all suits against the state unless legislative permission has 
been given. While the doctrine originated from the English common 
law notion that "the king can do no wrong,"17 its continued viability 
in Maryland has been based on policy grounds such as "fiscal 
considerations" and "administrative difficulties." 18 The court of 
appeals, despite the often unjust results for tort victims,19 has con-
tinually refused to abrogate the doctrine of sovereign immunity on 
the grounds that only the legislature can waive the state's immunity.20 
The full immunity vested in the state has never been extended 
to the state's counties and municipalities. Instead, the court of appeals 
has held that counties and municipalities are immune from suit only 
for governmental functions, and not for those functions deemed 
proprietary.21 The court reasoned that when a municipality is per-
17. Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d 
1027, 1030 (1979). 
18. Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 474, 287 A.2d 40, 42 (1972). 
The court of appeals summed up its reasons for refusing to abrogate the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity as follows: 
Id. 
[lIt is desirable and in the public interest that any change in the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the legislative 
branch of State Government rather than from the judicial branch 
inasmuch as there are fiscal considerations, administrative difficulties 
and other problems in balancing the rights of the State and its agencies 
with new possible rights of the individual citizens, which can far better 
be considered and resolved by the legislative branch than by the 
judiciary of the State. 
19. See Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 78, 405 A.2d 255, 269-70 
(1979) (Cole, J., dissenting). Judge Cole stated that, "[als the law now stands 
in Maryland, the injured citizen must bear all the harm thrust upon him by a 
negligent government. This is manifestly unjust and inequitable in light of 
contemporary concepts of cost spreading and the general rule that liability 
follows tortious conduct." Id. at 83, 405 A.2d at 272. 
20. See Department of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 59, 521 A.2d 
313,315 (1986) ("We have consistently declined to abrogate sovereign immunity 
by judicial fiat."); Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 
503, 512-13, 397 A.2d 1027, 1032 (1979) ("[Wle have consistently refused to 
judicially abrogate sovereign immunity .... "); Jekofsky v. State Roads 
Comm'n, 264 Md. 471, 474, 287 A.2d 40, 42 (1972) ("[Alny change in the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the legislative branch .... "). 
21. See, e.g., Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539,546-50,479 A.2d 1321, 
1324-26 (1984) (holding that the determination of whether county's operation 
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forming a governmental function, the same principles protecting the 
state from suit also justify protecting municipalities from suit.22 
The Maryland General Assembly has responded to the judiciary's 
call for action by enacting several statutory provisions waiving gov-
ernmental immunity. One of the most important of these enactments, 
the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA),23 waived the state's immunity 
for certain enumerated tort actions.24 One of these provisions, section 
5-403(a)(1), waives the state's immunity for "[a]n action to recover 
damages caused by the negligent maintenance or operation of a 
motor vehicle by a State employee. "25 
Another statutory waiver provision relevant to automobile acci-
dents involving government employees is section 19-103(c) of the 
transportation code. This section provides that an owner or lessee of 
an emergency vehicle is liable "for any damages caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an authorized operator while operating the emer-
gency vehicle in the performance of emergency service as defined in 
subsection (a) of this section. "26 The statutory definition of emergency 
of landfill is a government or proprietary function turns on amount of profit 
county made); Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 61-63, 405 A.2d 
255, 260-61 (1979) (holding city operation of day camp is a governmental 
function); Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 273-77, 195 A. 571, 
574-76 (1937) (holding city operation of municipal swimming pool is a govern-
mental function). 
22. Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267,271-72, 195 A. 571, 574 (1937). 
23. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 12-101 to -109 (1984 & Supp. 1992). At the 
time of the accident, the Act was codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PRoe. §§ 5-401 to -408 (1984). See infra note 24. 
24. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoe. § 5-403 (1984). The MTCA has been 
amended on several occasions. Effective October I, 1984, the act was moved 
to the State Government Article with some minor modifications to its language. 
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 to -109 (1984). Effective July I, 
1985, the General Assembly repealed the provision listing the categories of 
cases for which immunity was waived and replaced it with a general waiver of 
the state's tort immunity subject to enumerated exceptions. See id. § 12-104 
(Supp. 1992). In Boyer, because the accident occurred on August 9, 1984, the 
court applied the pre-1985 language of the Act. Boyer, 323 Md. at 565 n.2, 
594 A.2d at 124 n.2. Since the 1985 changes to the Act broadened the 
legislature's waiver of government immunity and would include all situations 
enumerated under the 1984 language as weII as new situations not previously 
covered, the changes to the Act are not pertinent to the Boyer decision. [d. 
25. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoe. § 5-403(a)(I) (1984). After the 1985 
changes to the MTCA, there no longer exists a specifically enumerated category 
of the waiver of the state's tort immunity for the negligent maintenance or 
operation of a motor vehicle. This category, however, is still encompassed in 
the broader language of the current MTCA. See supra note 24. 
26. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 19-103(c) (1987). In Boyer, the State argued that 
§ 19-103(c) only applies to political subdivisions and does not apply to the 
state. The court, however, did not decide the issue since § 19-103(c) provides 
no greater a waiver than already provided in § 5-403(a)(I) of the MTCA, 
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service includes "[p]ursuing a violator or a suspected violator of the 
law. "27 In the context of a police chase, therefore, the critical 
determination under both section 9-103(c) of the transportation code 
and section 5-403(a)(I) of the MTCA is what is included under the 
"negligent operation of a motor vehicle" language. 
Before Boyer, the Maryland courts had not decided whether a 
police officer's decision to pursue and continue to pursue a suspect 
constitutes negligence while operating an emergency vehicle within 
the meaning of section 19-103(c) of the transportation code and 
section 5-403(a)(1) of the MTCA. The only guidance the court of 
appeals has provided is that the phrase "operate a motor vehicle" 
is to be interpreted broadly, "much broader than the term drive. "28 
Under this interpretation, it seems likely that the commencement and 
continuation of a high speed pursuit will be found to be included 
within the phrase "operate a motor vehicle." This would be in accord 
with the majority of other jurisdictions which, when interpreting 
language similar to Maryland's, have held that a police officer's 
decision to pursue and continue to pursue may constitute the negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle. 29 
Public official immunity is another important form of immunity 
that was first adopted by the Maryland courts in 189830 and protects 
which explicitly waives the state's immunity in this situation. See Boyer, 323 
Md. at 581 n.16, 594 A.2d at 132 n.16. 
27. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 19-103(a)(3)(ii) (1987). 
28. Boyer, 323 Md. at 574, 594 A.2d at 129 (quoting Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 
314, 318, 353 A.2d 256, 258 (1976». The Thomas court distinguished driving 
and operating as follows: 
The words 'operating' and 'driving' are not synonymous; they have 
well-recognized statutory distinctions. Of the two terms, the latter is 
generally accorded a more strict and limited meaning. The term 
'driving' is generally used to mean, in this connection, steering and 
controlling a vehicle while in motion; the term 'operating,' on the 
other hand, is generally given a broader meaning to include starting 
the engine or manipulating the mechanical or electrical devices of a 
standing vehicle. 
Thomas, 277 Md. at 318, 353 A.2d at 258-59 (quoting McDuell v. State, 231 
A.2d 265, 267 (Dei. 1967». 
29. See, e.g., Miller v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 548 So. 
2d 880, 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("A police officer's negligent driving 
during a 'police chase' constitutes an operational level activity for which the 
governmental unit is not immune. "); Force v. Watkins, 544 A.2d 114, 115 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding allegations that pursuing police officers 
endangered life and property while exceeding speed limits was sufficient to 
bring claim within government immunity exception); Mason v. Bitton, 534 
P.2d 1360, 1365 (Wash. 1975) (holding that the decision to initiate and continue 
a high speed pursuit is not a "basic policy decision" and is not subject to 
immunity). 
30. Cocking v. Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 A. 104 (1898). 
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government officials from personal liability in certain circumstances. 
In James v. Prince George's County,31 the court of appeals formu-
lated a two part test to determine if public official immunity applies. 
First, the government actor must be a "public official rather than a 
mere government employee," and, second, the official's non-mali-
cious conduct must have occurred while he was "performing discre-
tionary, as opposed to ministerial acts in furtherance of his official 
duties. "32 
One of the first cases to apply the James test to alleged police 
negligence was Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County.33 Ashburn involved 
a suit brought by a pedestrian who was injured by an intoxicated 
driver after the defendant police officer failed to detain the suspected 
law breaker. 34 The court concluded that, for purposes of the first 
prong of the James test, a police officer is a public official when 
performing law enforcement functions. 35 Furthermore, the court held 
that a police officer's decision regarding whether a suspect should 
be detained is within the officer's discretion.36 The court concluded, 
therefore, that a police officer is not personally liable for damages 
caused by a suspect the officer failed to detain. 37 
If a police officer does makes a decision to apprehend a suspect 
and initiate a chase, it has not been decided whether an officer's 
pursuit is protected by the common law doctrine of public official 
immunity.38 There are, however, several statutory grounds of im-
31. 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980). 
32. [d. at 323, 418 A.2d at 1178 (emphasis in original). 
33. 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986). 
34. [d. at 619-20, 510 A.2d at 1079. 
35. [d. at 622, 510 A.2d at 1080. 
36. [d. at 626, 510 A.2d at 1082. In coming to this conclusion, the Ashburn court 
interpreted MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 16-20S.1(b)(2) (1987), which mandates 
certain procedures a police officer must follow if he detains a suspected 
intoxicated driver. The court concluded that once a police officer detains a 
suspected intoxicated driver, his duties become ministerial because the officer 
must comply with § 16-205. 1 (b)(2). The original decision to detain, however, 
is still discretionary and protected by public official immunity. Ashburn, 306 
Md. at 626-35, 510 A.2d at 1082-87. This holding was reaffirmed by the Boyer 
court. 323 Md. at 577-78, 594 A.2d at 130-31. 
37. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 626, 510 A.2d at 1082. 
38. The question has not yet been decided by the Maryland courts. The James 
court, however, did hold that the operation of a motor vehicle is "not ordinarily 
a discretionary act for which immunity will shield the driver from liability for 
negligence." 288 Md. at 328, 418 A.2d at 1180-81. The court of special appeals, 
however, held that the term "ordinary" in the James opinion denotes exceptions 
and it proceeded to apply public· official immunity to a police officer during 
a chase. Boyer v. State, 80 Md. App. 101, 106, 560 A.2d 48, SO (1989). When 
the Boyer case reached the court of appeals, the court refused to decide the 
issue since it held that the officers were protected by statutory immunity during 
the chase. The court did point out, however, that most of the other jurisdictions 
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munity to protect an officer from liabilities arising from the chase. 
Section 19-103(b) of the Transportation Code provides immunity to 
the operator of an emergency vehicle "in the performance of emer-
gency services . . . . "39 As previously mentioned, the statutory defi-
nition of emergency services includes a police pursuit of a suspected 
law breaker. 46 
Furthermore, a state employee could also rely on section 5-404(b) 
of the pre-1985 MTCA as a shield against liability. This section 
provides that if the state has waived its immunity for a particular 
tort, the employee who committed the tort will not be personally 
liable if he committed the tortious act while acting within the scope 
of his duties.41 
A police officer, however, will lose his immunity under both 
section 19-103(b) of the transportation code and section 5-404(b) of 
the MTCA if his conduct during the chase constitutes gross negli-
gence. Gross negligence, in the context of operating a motor vehicle, 
has been defined in Maryland as a "wanton and reckless disregard 
for human life" while operating the motor vehicle.42 Before Boyer, 
that have decided the issue hold that continuation of a chase is ministerial and 
not protected by public official immunity. Boyer, 323 Md. at 582 n.17, 594 
A.2d at 133 n.17. 
39. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 19-103(b)(1) (1992). This section provides: 
Id. 
An operator of an emergency vehicle, who is authorized to operate 
the emergency vehicle by its owner or lessee while operating the 
emergency vehicle in the performance of emergency service as defined 
in subsection (a) of this section shall have the immunity from liability 
described under § 5-399.5 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article. 
40. Id. § 19-103(a)(3)(ii). 
41. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. Paoc. § 5-399.2(b) (Supp. 1992). This section 
provides: 
State personnel are immune from suit in courts of the state and from 
liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope 
of the public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice 
or gross negligence, and for which the State or its units have waived 
immunity under Title 12, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article, 
even if the damages exceed the limits of that waiver. 
Id. The forerunner of this code provision was section 5-404(b) of the pre-1985 
MTCA, which provided: 
A State employee who has acted within the scope of his public duties, 
absent malice or gross negligence, is not liable in his individual capacity 
for any damages resulting from tortious conduct for which the State 
has waived its immunity under this subtitle, even when the damages 
exceed the limits of the state's waiver of immunity. 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. Paoc. § 5-404(b) (1984). 
42. Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 366-67, 539 A.2d 1113, 1124-25 (1988). The 
Nast court held that driving under the influence of alcohol, without more, 
does not constitute wanton or reckless behavior. Id. at 366, 539 A.2d at 1124. 
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Maryland courts had not applied this standard to the conduct of 
police officers during a high speed chase. Other jurisdictions with 
similar language, however, have been slow to find a police officer 
guilty of gross negligence while pursuing a suspect. 43 
Once it has been determined that there has been a waiver of 
immunity, the next step is to determine if an actual tort has been 
committed. It is, of course, settled law in Maryland that in order 
for negligence to exist there must be "the breach of some duty that 
one person owes to another."44 In the context of a police chase, it 
must be determined whether a police officer engaged in a high speed 
chase owes a duty to other drivers and pedestrians. 
Under Maryland law, it is clear that police officers are exempt 
from certain traffic laws while in the performance of emergency 
service.4s It is equally clear under Maryland statutory law, however, 
that these privileges do not "relieve the driver of an emergency 
vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all 
persons."46 The court of appeals has interpreted this statutory duty 
to mean that the operator of an emergency vehicle must "exercise 
reasonable care and diligence under the circumstances. "47 
In Keesling v. State,48 the court of appeals also imposed a 
common law duty on police officers. Keesling involved a state trooper 
who allegedly assisted criminals in commandeering an innocent third 
party's automobile.49 The court, in reversing summary judgement for 
The court also held, relying on Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 
149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972), that the wanton or reckless standard was all that 
was required for a punitive damage award. [d. at 350-52, 539 A.2d at 1116-
18. The court of appeals, howt;ver, has recently overruled this aspect of NasI 
and Smith and now requires actual malice for punitive damages awards. Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). 
43. See Breck v. Cortez, 490 N.E.2d 88, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that in 
light of the danger arising from the suspect's reckless driving, the officer's 
conduct during pursuit was not willful and wanton); Bullins v. Schmidt, 369 
S.E.2d 601, 604 (N.C. 1988) (holding officers were not grossly negligent during 
pursuit since they used emergency equipment and kept vehicle under control); 
Peak v. Ratliff, 408 S.E.2d 300, 309-10 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that officer's 
conduct during pursuit, which included speeds approaching one hundred miles 
per hour, did not constitute gross negligence as a matter of law). 
44. West Virginia Cent. & Pittsburg Rail Co. v. Fuller, 96 Md. 652, 666, 54 A. 
669, 671 (1903). 
45. See~ e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 21-106 (1992) (providing that a police 
officer may, in certain circumstances, exceed maximum speed limits and drive 
through stop signs and red lights). 
46. [d. § 21-106(d). 
47. Martin v. Rossignol, 226 Md. 363, 369, 174 A.2d 149, 152 (1961) (quoting 
Baltimore City v. Fire Ins. Salvage Corps, 219 Md. 75, 148 A.2d 444, 447 
(1959». 
48. 288 Md. 579, 420 A.2d 261 (1980). 
49. [d. at 581-82, 420 A.2d at 262. 
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the state, held that a police officer owes a duty of care to a private 
citizen when the officer's conduct has put "a private citizen in a 
zone of danger without reasonable justification, "50 and if he "set in 
motion a chain of events which ... [he] knew or should have known 
would lead to [injury]. "51 
Before Boyer, the Maryland Courts had not decided whether the 
statutory and common law duty imposed on Maryland police officers 
applies to innocent third parties injured by a suspect fleeing from 
law enforcement officialsY A large number of other jurisdictions, 
however, have decided the issue, and these cases can generally be 
divided into three groups. The modern trend holds that a police 
officer does owe a duty to third parties injured by suspects fleeing 
police in the course of a high speed case. 53 These cases have recognized 
that both the pursuing officer and the fleeing suspect can contribute 
to causing injuries to third parties.54 
The second group of states hold that while a police officer owes 
a duty to a third party injured by a suspect fleeing the officer at 
50. [d. at 589, 420 A.2d at 266. 
51. [d. at 591, 420 A.2d at 267. 
52. The court of appeals has held that when a police officer chooses not to 
apprehend a suspect, he owes no duty to third parties who are subsequently 
injured by the suspect. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 
A.2d 1078 (1986). However, as the Boyer Court noted, the holding of Ashburn 
does not apply to allegedly negligent conduct during the course of a high speed 
chase. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 584, 594 A.2d 121, 134 (1991). 
53. See, e.g., Biscoe v. Arlington County, 738 F.2d 1352, 1363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting gross negligence standard and holding that the proper standard for 
the District of Columbia is due care), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Tetro 
v. Town of Stratford, 458 A.2d 5, 10 (Conn. 1983) (holding that police officers 
are not entitled to blanket immunity for their negligence during pursuit of a 
suspected criminal); Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 339 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Mich. 
1983) (holding emergency vehicles must be driven with due regard for others); 
Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S. W.2d 94, 99 (Tex. 1992) ("The decision to 
initiate or continue pursuit may be negligent when the heightened risk of injury 
to third parties is unreasonable in relation to the interest in apprehending 
suspects."); Mason v. Bitton, 534 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Wash. 1975) (holding that 
police officers owe a duty of due care which can be violated even if police 
vehicle itself not involved in accident). 
54. The Tetro court, for example, held that "[t]he intervention of negligent or 
even reckless behavior by the driver of the car whom the police pursue does 
not, under the emergent majority view, require the conclusion that there is a 
lack of proximate cause between police negligence and an innocent victim's 
injuries." Tetro, 458 A.2d at 8. The reason the modern trend refuses to find 
a lack of proximate cause on the part of the pursuing officer is the belief that 
an accident between the suspect and the third party is a foreseeable result of 
a police pursuit. One court noted that "[a]lthough the criminal conduct of a 
third party may be a superseding cause which relieves the negligent actor from 
liability, the actor's negligence is not superseded and will not be excused when 
the criminal conduct is a foreseeable result of such negligence." Travis, 830 
S.W.2d at 98. 
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high speeds, this duty is only breached if the officer is grossly 
negligent. 55 The third, and smallest, group of jurisdictions hold that 
a police officer is not liable to a third party hit by a suspect engaged 
in a high speed chase. 56 These cases proceed on the ground that a 
police officer's pursuit of a suspect is not the proximate cause of an 
injury sustained by a third party hit by the fleeing suspect.57 This 
view, however, has been rejected by many courts and commentators. 58 
IV. THE BOYER DECISION 
The court of appeals in Boyer held that: (1) commencing and 
maintaining a high speed chase may constitute "negligence while 
operating a motor vehicle" within the meaning of the statutory 
provisions waiving governmental immunity;59 (2) a police officer is 
personally immune in commencing and continuing a high speed chase 
of a suspect;60 and (3) a police officer engaged in a high speed chase 
55. See, e.g., Breck v. Cortez, 490 N.E.2d 88, 93 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) ("police 
officers owe the general public a duty to refrain from willful and wanton 
misconduct in the pursuit of suspected law violators."); Bullins v. Schmidt, 
369 S.E.2d 601, 603 (N.C. 1988) (holding that when a third party's injuries 
are a result of a collision with the pursued vehicle rather than the police 
vehicle, the officer's conduct must be grossly negligent for the third party to 
recover); Peak v. Ratliff, 408 S;E.2d 300, 307-08 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that 
a police officer is only liable to a third party injured by a pursued suspect if 
the officer's pursuit amounted to reckless conduct or gross negligence). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Hutchins, 268 F.2d 69, 72 (6th Cir. 1959) (holding 
that it is the conduct of the suspect rather than the pursuing officer that is 
the proximate cause of the third-party's injuries); Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk 
Co., 245 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952) ("It is our conclusion that the 
action of the police was not the legal or proximate cause of the accident .... "); 
see also Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655, 668 (Kan. 1983) (holding that even 
though police officers. have a duty of due care, pursuing a suspect is not a 
breach of this duty); Kelly v. City of Tulsa, 791 P.2d 826, 829 (Okla. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that a police officer's pursuit was not, as a matter of 
law, the proximate cause of the accident between the third party and the 
pursued suspect). 
57. One court summed up the lack of proximate cause argument as follows: 
To argue that the officers' pursuit caused [the suspect] to speed may 
be factually true, but it does not follow that the officers are liable at 
law for the results of [the suspect's] negligent speed. Police cannot 
be made insurers of the conduct of the culprits they chase. It is our 
conclusion that the action of the police was not the legal or proximate 
cause of the accident . . . . 
Chambers, 245 S.W.2d at 591. 
58. See Boyer, 323 Md. at 587-88 n.18, 594 A.2d at 136 n.18 (listing authorities 
in support of proposition that a proximate cause analysis is not appropriate in 
high speed pursuit cases). 
59. [d. at 574-76, 594 A.2d at 129. 
60. [d. at 578, 594 A.2d at 131. 
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owes a duty to third parties injured by the fleeing suspect. 61 
The court first addressed the issue of whether the state and 
Charles County had waived their immunity in the context of Trooper 
Titus's chase of Farrar. The state and Charles County argued that 
commencing and maintaining a police chase was not within the 
"negligent operation of a motor vehicle" language in section 19-
103(c) of the transportation code and in section 5-403(a)(I) of the 
pre-1985 MTCA.62 The court of appeals, however, noting the broad 
reading previously given to the phrase "operate a motor vehicle, "63 
held that operating a motor vehicle includes more that just the 
mechanics of driving, it can also include a decision to operate or 
continue to operate.64 The court concluded, therefore, that govern-
mental immunity may be waived when a police officer negligently 
commences and maintains a high speed chase of a suspect. 65 
The court then addressed the plaintiffs' claim that Trooper Titus 
should be held personally liable for the damages caused by Farrar. 
The court reasoned that since Ashburn held that a police officer is 
protected by public official immunity when deciding not to apprehend 
a suspect, Trooper Titus was not liable for his decision not to 
apprehend Farrar at the red light.66 As far a Trooper Titus's immunity 
during the chase, the court held that section 19-103(b) of the trans-
portation code "flatly renders the operator of an emergency vehicle 
'immune from suit ... for any damages resulting from a negligent 
act or omission while operating an emergency vehicle."'67 Further-
more, the court recognized that under section 5-404(b) of the pre-
1985 MTCA, a state employee is not personally liable for damages 
61. [d. at 585-88, 594 A.2d at 134-36. 
62. [d. at 573-75, 594 A.2d at 128-29. 
63. See Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 318, 353 A.2d 256, 258 (1976). 
64. Boyer, 323 Md. at 575, 594 A.2d at 129. The plaintiffs, however, did not 
allege that Charles County owned the vehicles used in the chase, a critical 
element under § 19-103(c). [d. at 575-76, 594 A.2d at 130. The court, therefore, 
remanded the case to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove ownership. 
[d. at 575-76, 594 A.2d at 130. 
65. [d. at 578-79, 594 A.2d at 131. The court of special appeals, relying on 
Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979), held 
that the State was not liable for damages caused by a State employee who is 
personally immune. Boyer v. State, 80 Md. App. 101, 106, 560 A.2d 48, 50 
(1989). The court of appeals, however, noted that this aspect of Bradshaw was 
overruled by James. After James, if the government has waived immunity, it 
is still liable even if the government employees are not personally liable. Boyer, 
323 Md. at 582-83, 594 A.2d at 133. 
66. Boyer, 323 Md. at 577-78, 594 A.2d at 130-31. 
67. [d. at 578, 594 A.2d at 131. The plaintiffs argued that § 19-103(b) does not 
apply to state employees if they are grossly negligent, but the court rejected 
this argument and held that § 19-103 protects a state police officer. [d. at 581 
n.16, 594 A.2d at 132-33 n.16. 
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resulting from conduct for which the state has waived its immunity, 
and, since the court had already held that the state waived its 
immunity for the negligent commencement and continuation of a 
high speed chase, Trooper Titus was immune under this section as 
well. 68 
The court noted, however, that under these two sections Trooper 
Titus could still be liable if his actions constituted gross negligence.69 
The plaintiffs asserted that the trooper travelled at dangerous rates 
of speed through heavy traffic without complying with accepted 
police practices and without immediately activating all his emergency 
equipment. 70 The court concluded that these allegations did not 
amount to gross negligence as a matter of law.71 According to the 
court, these allegations did not support the conclusion that Trooper 
Titus acted "with wanton or reckless disregard for others. "72 
After determining that both the state and Charles County had 
waived their immunity while Trooper Titus had not, the court was 
left to decide whether the trooper owed the Boyers a duty of care. 
The court examined existing Maryland law and concluded that Trooper 
Titus owed the Boyers a duty of care if he placed them in "a zone 
of danger without reasonable justification" and if he "set in motion 
a chain of events which ... [he] knew or should have known would 
lead to . . . [the Boyers'] injur[ies]. "73 After recognizing that there 
were no Maryland cases applying this duty to high speed police 
pursuits, the court surveyed the law in other jurisdictions and adopted 
the majority position that a police officer who engages in a high 
speed pursuit owes a duty to third parties injured by the fleeing 
suspect.74 The court rejected the minority view that an officer's 
pursuit of a suspect is not the proximate cause of injuries sustained 
by a third party injured by the suspect during the chase. 75 The court 
68. [d. at 578, 594 A.2d at 131. 
69. [d. at 578-79, 594 A.2d at 131-32. 
70. [d. at 579-80, 594 A.2d at 132. 
71. [d. at 580, 594 A.2d at 132. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. at 585-86, 594 A.2d at 134-35 (quoting Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 
589, 591, 420 A.2d 261, 266-67 (1980». 
74. [d. at 586-88, 594 A.2d at 135-36. The court held that "Trooper Titus and 
the deputy sheriffs, in engaging in the high speed pursuit of Mr. Farrar, owed 
a duty of care to the Boyers." [d. 
75. [d. at 587-88 n.18, 594 A.2d at 136 n.18. The court recognized that the cases 
refusing to hold a police officer liable for injuries caused by a suspect fleeing 
from the officer do so on the basis that the police officer is not the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. [d. The court rejected this analysis by reasoning 
that there can be more than one cause for an injury and that it can, at times, 
be foreseeable that a police officer's engagement of a high speed chase could 
be the proximate cause of an innocent third party hit by the fleeing suspect. 
[d. 
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concluded, therefore, that Trooper Titus and the Charles County 
Deputy Sheriffs owed a duty of care to the Boyers when they engaged 
in a high speed pursuit of Farrar. 76 
Since this was a case of first impression, the court proceeded to 
give some guidance as to when this new-found duty would be 
breached.77 The standard to be applied is that of "a reasonably 
prudent police officer ... faced with the same difficult emergency 
situation. "78 The court noted that violations of the Maryland Trans-
portation Code, or mere conclusury allegations alone, are not suffi-
cient. 79 Instead, the plaintiff must state with specificity allegations of 
negligence which proximately caused the injury. 80 
V. ANALYSIS 
Most of the court's pronouncements in Boyer are logical exten-
sions of existing Maryland law. By holding that negligent commence-
ment and maintenance of a high speed chase falls within the "negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle" language of the governmental waiver 
provisions, the court was extending its previous holding that the term 
"operate" is to be given a broad reading.81 This is in accord with 
other cases which have reasoned that if the legislature intended that 
only the mechanical aspects of driving be covered rather than in-
cluding driving decisions, it would have used the term "drive" instead 
of "operate". 82 This interpretation is also in line with the legislative 
pronouncement that all statutory waiver provisions are to be read 
broadly to provide plaintiffs with a means of recovery. 83 
In holding that Trooper Titus was personally immune, the court 
reaffirms its traditional position of giving police officers a great deal 
of protection when the officers are performing their official duties. 84 
76. Id. at 588, 594 A.2d at 136. 
77. The question of whether the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence were enough 
to constitute a breach of duty was not addressed by the lower courts and, 
therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case for determination of this 
issue. Id. at 588-89, 594 A.2d at 136. 
78. Id. at 589, 594 A.2d at 136. 
79. Id. at 589 n.20, 594 A.2d at 136 n.20. 
80.Id. 
81. Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 353 A.2d 256 (1976). 
82. See McDuell v. State, 231 A.2d 265, 267 (Del. 1967). 
83, See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 12-102 (1984). 
84. See, e.g., Taylor v. Mayor of Baltimore, 314 Md. 125, 549 A.2d 749 (1988) 
(holding that police officer responding to emergency without siren is stilI 
operating an emergency vehicle and is immune from liability for simple negli-
gence); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986) 
(holding that police officer not liable for injuries to third persons inflicted by 
drunk driver officer failed to detain); Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 
284 Md. 294, 396 A.2d 255 (1979) (finding police officer immune from liability 
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This policy stems from the notion that a police officer should be 
given wide latitude to effectively perform his law enforcement func-
tions.8s The court takes this notion even further when it applies gross 
negligence to the context of a police chase and concludes that, even 
though Trooper Titus failed to immediately activate his emergency 
equipment and failed to comply with police practices, his conduct 
did not constitute "wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of 
others. "86 It appears, therefore, that a police officer's behavior will 
have to be outrageous before a court will hold him personally liable. 
This may have the unfortunate side effect of encouraging police 
officers to use more dangerous tactics than they would otherwise 
use. Since the state or county of employment will have to pay for 
the officer's ordinary negligence, however, it is unlikely the officer's 
supervisors will allow the officer to take advantage of his personal 
immunity. 
The major holding in Boyer, that police officers, when engaging 
in a high speed chase of a suspect, owe a duty of care to third 
parties injured by the fleeing suspect, can be supported on several 
different grounds. The first is that the court is simply extending the 
existing law regarding a police officer's duty to the context of a high 
speed chase. The court examined existing law and concluded that 
Trooper Titus owed a duty to Mr. and Mrs. Boyer only if he "set 
in motion a chain of events which . . . [he] knew or should have 
known would lead to . . . [the Boyers'] injuries. "87 The court then 
chose to follow the majority view and impose a duty on Troo"'er 
Titus. It appears, therefore, that the court is holding that wh( ;;t 
police officer engages in a high speed chase, he has set in motion a 
chain of events which he should have known would lead to injuries. 
This proposition is a sensible extension of Maryland tort law. 
Imposing a duty on a police officer during a high speed chase 
may also be justified on the basis of a balancing test: The two 
conflicting interests that must be balanced are the need to apprehend 
criminals and the need to protect the public from unnecessary injury. 88 
for failure to care for victim of crime in order to preserve evidence), overruled 
on other grounds by James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 
1173 (1980). 
85. See Arrington v. Moore, 31 Md. App. 448, 358 A.2d 909 (1976). The Arrington 
court believed that "[iJf law enforcement officers are compelled to keep the 
peace at their peril, without some discretion as to how to respond to an 
apparent crisis, the peace will simply not be kept." [d. at 461, 358 A.2d at 
916. 
86. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 588, 594 A.2d 121, 136. 
87. [d. at 585-86, 594 A.2d at 134-35 (quoting Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 
591, 420 A.2d 261, 267 (1980». 
88. See Geoffrey P. Alpert, Analyzing Police Pursuit, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 358, 361 
(July-Aug. 1991). 
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The court has implicitly concluded that while the need to apprehend 
criminals is important, it must, to a certain extent, give way to the 
need to protect the general public. Thus, while police officers may 
still engage in high speed pursuits, they must now conduct these 
pursuits with due care. 
A third reason justifying the decision in Boyer is that it provides 
a remedy for innocent tort victims. Many victims of accidents caused 
by a suspect fleeing the police are unable to recover because of 
governmental immunity or because of the absence of a duty of care 
imposed on a police officer. In Boyer, the court removed these 
obstacles by allowing a plaintiff injured by a fleeing suspect to 
recover from the government if the officer has breached his duty of 
due care. 
The greatest impact of the Boyer decision will be on the various 
law enforcement agencies throughout the state. Although individual 
officers will still be immune, high level police officials will now be 
forced to address the issue of accidents resulting from high speed 
pursuits. These officials will need to develop programs aimed at 
reducing the number of accidents resulting from high speed pursuits. 
Fortunately, several methods have been suggested to accomplish these 
goals. 
Many commentators feel that if police departments promulgate 
clear policies listing the many considerations that should be taken 
into account before an officer engages in a pursuit, this will reduce 
the number of resulting accidents.89 Police officers should also be 
given behind-the-wheel as well as classroom training on how to handle 
high speed pursuit situations, making it less likely that an officer 
will violate his duty of due care during a pursuit. 90 Furthermore, 
alternatives to high speed pursuits, such as the use of helicopters to 
pursue suspects, should also be developed.91 
The decision in Boyer, however, may send the wrong message 
to law enforcement officials. Instead of encouraging police to exercise 
more care during a chase, it may encourage police officers not to 
89. See Richard G. Zevitz, Police Civil Liability and the Law of High Speed 
Pursuit, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 237, 241 (1987). It has been suggested that the 
following factors be considered before commencement of a high speed pursuit: 
seriousness of crime, road conditions, traffic conditions, weather conditions, 
police vehicle type and condition, pedestrian traffic, time of day, geographic 
location, the officer's familiarity with area, experience of the officer, visibility, 
possibility of later apprehension, location of pursuit, and the likelihood of 
success. Leonard Territo, Citizen Safety: Key Element in Police Pursuit Policy, 
18 TRIAL, Aug. 1982, at 31-32. 
90. See Carlin, supra note 2, at 1l7. 
91. See Doug Struck, Police Taking the Heat for Hot-Pursuit Policies, DALT. SUN, 
Jan. 20, 1985, at AlO. 
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pursue, thereby allowing a suspect a means of escape.92 This appears 
to be a possibility due to the fact that, under already existing 
Maryland law, a police officer has no duty to third parties injured 
by a suspect the officer chose not to apprehend. 93 If, on the other 
hand, the officer does decide to apprehend the suspect, he does owe 
a duty of care to third parties.94 It appears, therefore, that law 
enforcement officials will perceive that the safest route to take, in 
terms of possible future civil liability, is to let a suspect escape 
instead of trying to apprehend him. 
The court of appeals arguably could have avoided the negative 
incentives that Boyer may instill in police officials by joining with 
the group of jurisdictions that hold an officer to a gross negligence 
standard during high speed pursuits.9s The court, however, implicitly 
decided that giving police officers this much leeway would unjusti-
fiably create too great a risk to the general public. Nonetheless, by 
defining the standard of care as that of "a reasonably prudent police 
officer . . . faced with the same difficult emergency situation,"96 it 
appears that a major mistake is required for an officer to be found 
to have breached his standard of due care. The court of appeals, 
therefore, has provided the public with increased protection without 
completely forsaking police discretion in high speed pursuits. 
It is unlikely that all accidents resulting from high speed pursuits 
of suspected law breakers will be completely avoided. The Boyer 
decision, however, gives the innocent victims of such accidents a 
remedy. While suits could almost always be maintained against the 
suspected law breaker who injures the plaintiff, the Boyer court has 
provided these victims an opportunity to dip into the government 
treasuries as a means of compensation. The availability of more 
money will, of course, almost certainly inspire more claims being 
filed and more litigation. The number of claims, however, will likely 
decrease as police officers adapt to the new duty of care imposed 
on them during high speed pursuits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Boyer, the Court of Appeals has provided some sensible 
answers to some difficult problems. The new duty imposed in Boyer 
92. In the view of some police departments, a major reduction in the amount of 
high speed chases is a desirable goal. The Baltimore police department, for 
example, instituted a strict policy not to engage in high speed pursuits. Struck, 
supra note 91, at AI0. 
93. See. supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
94. Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 588, 594 A.2d 121, 136 (1991). 
95. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
96. Boyer, 323 Md. at 589, 594 A.2d at 136. 
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should encourage police officers to proceed with caution when en-
gaging in high speed pursuits and this should lead to a reduction in 
the number of injuries suffered as a result of high speed chases. It 
is, of course, unlikely that the problem can be avoided completely, 
but when injuries do occur, the Boyer court has made it easier for 
a victim to be compensated. Hopefully, the decision will also draw 
attention to the necessity of further reform so that future tragedies 
may be avoided. 
Phillip M. Pickus 
